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DOES CHINA HAVE ALIMONY?: A STUDY 
OF CHINA’S CURRENT POST–DIVORCE 
FINANCIAL RELIEF SYSTEM
Jason J. Lee*
Abstract
Under China’s current Marriage Law amended and enacted in 2001, 
its post–divorce financial relief system comprises three disparate com-
ponent parts.  The principal part and the one analogous to the American 
concept of “alimony” or “spousal support” is the “post–divorce financial 
assistance system,” as authorized under Article 42.  The other two parts, 
“economic compensation at divorce” and “divorce damage claims system,” 
as authorized under Article 40 and Article 46, respectively, complement the 
principal part.  After a brief historical overview of China’s alimony legisla-
tions, this Article offers a doctrinal analysis of the two more straightforward 
components as embodied by Article 40 and Article 46.  Then it delves into 
an in-depth textual criticism of Article 42, and its concomitant 1984 SPC’s 
Judicial Opinions and Article  27 of the 2001 SPC’s Judicial Interpreta-
tions, the three constituents of the entire corpus of China’s “alimony laws.” 
Through the lenses of California’s divorce laws, focusing on the current judi-
cial interpretations and practices, the author candidly critiques the Chinese 
sui generis body of “alimony laws.”  The author arrives at such significant 
findings: (1) The statutes and judicial interpretations are too vague to be of 
much practical guidance when judges decide issues such as the eligibility 
prerequisites for invoking the law and the criteria for rendering financial 
assistance; (2) The law is fraught with loopholes; (3) The law is obsolete 
and does not suit the current socioeconomic reality of China.  The author 
observes that such vague, defective and obsolete laws leave too many key 
issues to the judges’ vagaries.  The author makes concrete recommendations 
and suggests specific remedies to close the loopholes and fill the gaps in the 
current post–divorce financial assistance system.  The author advances the 
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theory that the absence of an elaborate, systematic set of alimony laws and 
procedural rules is the direct result of the Party-state’s overemphasis on 
mediation and a diehard feature of the rule of man, to the detriment of the 
rule of law.  The author describes this trait as the corollary of the triumph 
of Confucianism over Legalism as manifested in contemporary China.  The 
author marks out the stumbling blocks to reforming China’s current ali-
mony laws and cautions that the eventual reification of the proposed rules 
and legal remedies will hinge upon the outcome of the rivalry between the 
synthesists’ views of rule of law and the thin theories of rule of law.
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I. Historical Overview of China’s Alimony Laws
“Brevity” and “vagueness” are the hallmarks of all alimony or 
 quasi-alimony provisions found in the statutes enacted in modern 
China.  In 1911, China’s last imperial dynasty met its end and a modern 
era dawned.  The Manchu rulers had compiled a draft civil code, but 
before it was officially promulgated, the Manchu Dynasty (1644–1911) 
was overthrown.  The Manchu Code devoted one sentence to the subject 
of alimony: “if the divorce results from the husband’s fault, the husband 
should render the wife such temporary compensation as appropriate to 
support her life.”1 The Code does not quantify “temporariness;” nor does 
1. The Draft Manchu Code provides in pertinent part: “The petition of dissolu-
tion of marriage shall be adjudicated under the preceding provision; but according to 
Article 1362, if the divorce results from the husband’s fault, the husband should render 
the wife such temporary compensation as appropriate to support her life.”  Da Qing 
Minlü Caoan (大清民律草案) [Draft Qing Dynasty Civil Code] art. 1369.
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it set the legal parameters for “compensation as appropriate to support” 
the wife’s life, leaving it all to the wide discretions of the judges, a diehard 
feature of the rule of man.
The Provisional Civil Code of the Republic of China pronounced in 
1913 fared slightly better than its immediate predecessor in that it allot-
ted more words to alimony.  It stated that “[t]he purpose of alimony is to 
give the wife a means of sustenance,” which must be “reasonable, being 
based upon the husband’s financial and social condition.”2 Again, it failed 
to particularize “a means of sustenance” and “reasonableness.”  Part IV 
“Family Law,” Article 10573 of the 1930 Civil Code of the Republic of 
China conditioned receipt of “appropriate financial support” on nonfault 
of the recipient spouse who has been subjected to “hardships in life” 
by divorce but fell short of defining “fault” or “hardships in life.”  The 
laconic drafters of the above civil codes as pertaining to alimony could 
have employed more words to make the alimony provision’s import more 
precise and its application more expedient.  In law, less is just less.
Under China’s current Marriage Law of 2001, the post–divorce 
spousal support is embodied in Article 42,4 which reads:
If, at the time of divorce, either party has difficulties in life, the other 
party shall render appropriate assistance from his or her personal 
property like house, etc.  Specific arrangements shall be agreed upon 
by both parties.  In case no agreement is agreed upon, the people’s 
court shall make a decision.
 The origin of Article 42 can be traced back to Article 335 of the 
1980 Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, which in turn can 
2. Robert T. Bryan, Jr., The Divorce Law of China, 4 Chinese Soc. & Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 126, 129–32 (1919).  Bryan notes:
This section provides that in case the husband is guilty of one of the caus-
es of divorce the wife, if she is not guilty of a cause for divorce and is 
successful in her suit, may obtain alimony.  The husband is not entitled 
to alimony under any circumstances.  The purpose of alimony is to give 
the wife a means of sustenance.  The alimony must be reasonable, being 
based upon the husband’s financial and social conditions.  A concubine is 
never entitled to alimony, as there was no marriage and she is not there-
fore entitled to a divorce.
Id. at 131.
3. The provision states: “If divorce subjects a party, not at fault, to hardships 
in life, the other party, albeit not at fault either, should render [the needy party] ap-
propriate financial support.”  Min Fa (民法) [Civil Code] (promulgated Dec. 26, 1930, 
effective May 5, 1931), art.  1057, http://tsn.taitung.gov.tw/changbin/map-2/station3/ 
station3-12.htm [https://perma.cc/8ZKS-A5KE].
4. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa (中华人民共和国婚姻法) 
[2001 Marriage Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective Apr. 28, 2001), art. 42, Lawinfochina.com, http://www. 
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1793&lib=law [https://perma.cc/3MGG-SHSV].
5. Article 33 of the 1980 law states: “At divorce, if one party is experiencing hard-
ships in life, the other party should provide appropriate financial assistance.  Specific 
arrangements shall be agreed upon by both parties.  In case no agreement is reached, 
the people’s court shall make a decision.”  Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa (
中华人民共和国婚姻法) [1980 Marriage Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
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be traced back to Article 256 of its 1950 Marriage Law.  All three spousal 
support provisions were passed by the same legislative body, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), within the space of half a century.  They deliver 
identical legislative messages in almost identical language, contain iden-
tical ambiguities, and result in identical difficulties of judicial application. 
A Chinese proverb best captures the legislative inadequacies inhering in 
these provisions: “Old medicine contained in new bottles.”  It is China’s 
Marriage Law of 2001 that is the subject of study of this Article.
II. China’s Current Tripartite Post–Divorce Financial 
Relief System
A. Brief Overview
In 2001, China’s NPC amended its Marriage Law.  Under the 
“newly” enacted marriage, its post–divorce financial relief system com-
prises three disparate component parts.  The principal part and the one 
analogous to the American concept of “alimony” or “spousal support” is 
the “post–divorce financial assistance system,” as authorized under Arti-
cle  42.  The other two parts, “economic compensation at divorce” and 
“divorce damage claims system,” as authorized under Article 40 and 
Article 46, respectively, complement the principal part.
B. Article 40 of the 2001 Marriage Law Governs the Economic 
Compensation Regime That Resembles California Family Code 
§ 4320(a)(2),7 § 4320(b),8 and § 26419
Article  40 of the 2001 Marriage Law complements Article  42 in 
economically compensating a party at divorce who has expended time, 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981) art. 33, Law-lib.com, 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=44312 [https://perma.cc/6SW3-WBPG].
6. Article 25 of the 1950 law provides:
Following divorce, if one party is not remarried and is experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties in life, the other party should assist the needy party in 
making a living.  The specific form and duration of such assistance shall 
be mutually agreed upon between the parties.  If such an agreement can-
not be reached, the people’s court shall make a decision.
 Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa (中华人民共和国婚姻法) [1950 
Marriage Law of China] (promulgated May 1, 1950, effective May 1, 1950) art. 25, Nat’l 
People’s Cong., http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/rlys/2014-10/24/content_1882723.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X3CS-TK58].
7. Cal. Fam. Code § 4320 (West 2013) (“In ordering spousal support . . . , the 
court shall consider the following circumstances . . . [t]he extent to which the support-
ed party’s present and future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemploy-
ment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote 
time to domestic duties.”).
8. “In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider the fol-
lowing circumstances . . . [t]he extent to which the supported party contributed to the 
attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting 
party.  Id.
9. Section 2641 provides authority for reimbursement of educational expenses 
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effort and resources during marriage in rearing the child(ren) of the 
marriage, looking after the elderly, and assisting the other party in pro-
fessional and career advancement.  The benefited party is statutorily 
required to pay compensation to the assisting party for the domestic 
and household services rendered and received.  It bears striking similar-
ities to California Family Code § 4320(a)(2), § 4320(b) and § 2641.  It is 
meant to return the compensated party to the status quo ante that she 
had enjoyed before marriage.
Article 40, however, is only legally operative where “both husband 
and wife agree to separately own the property they respectively obtain 
during the existence of their marriage and either of them has spent con-
siderably more effort on supporting children, taking care of the old or 
assisting the other party in work, etc . . . .”10
The prerequisite for invoking Article  40 is that the parties have 
signed a written prenuptial agreement or postnuptial agreement defining 
the respective parties’ separate property rights and stipulating that there 
will be no community property or assets created by virtue of and in the 
course of the said marriage.  Most contemporary Chinese couples, how-
ever, adopt a community property system when they get married.  It is not 
customary in China that couples betrothed to each other sign a prenup-
tial agreement.  While it is a generally accepted practice in America for 
couples in contemplation of marriage to directly bargain and expressly 
contract regarding their respective property rights during marriage, espe-
cially at the time of divorce and death, Chinese lovers usually shy away 
from directly discussing provisions to be made in case of divorce and 
death.  Therefore, talking about a prenuptial agreement during courtship 
is for sure a deal breaker and love killer in the Chinese culture.  After 
marriage, it is rare that Chinese newlyweds execute postnuptial prop-
erty agreements because broaching the subject signifies the intention of 
untying the knot in the minds of most Chinese and signing the postnup-
tial agreement is tantamount to tolling the death knell for their marriage. 
For these reasons, the divorce economic compensation regime has very 
limited practical application in the real world.11
that have benefited primarily one party to the marriage.  Cal. Fam. Code § 2641 (West 
2004).  Although the education, degree, or license or the resulting enhanced earning 
capacity is not “property” subject to division, community expenditures for them are 
properly subject to reimbursement.
10. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa (中华人民共和国婚姻法) 
[2001 Marriage Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective Apr. 28, 2001), art. 40, Lawinfochina.com, http://www. 
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1793&lib=law [https://perma.cc/3MGG-SHSV].
11. Wei Chen, Lei Shi, & Wenjun He, Empirical Research on Judicial Practice of 
the Post–divorce Relief System—Targeted on Sampled Cases handled in a Grassroots 
People’s Court in Chongqing in 2010–2012, 2014 Int’l Surv. Fam. L. 51 (2014).  These 
three researchers sampled a total of 360 cases handled in a trial court in Chongqing 
and interviewed the respective judges who decided these cases.  They discovered that 
out of the 360 cases, a party petitioned for Article 42 compensation at divorce in only 
fifteen cases, accounting for only 4.2 percent.  They sought for economic compensation 
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C. Article 46 of the 2001 Marriage Law Confers Statutory Authority  
to Award Fault-Based Tort Damages to the Injured Spouse  
at Time of Divorce
China’s current divorce laws are still heavily fault-based even 
though the fault theory of divorce was repudiated in California almost 
half a century ago through the enactment of the Family Law Act in the 
1970s.12  Article 46 of the 2001 Marriage Law provides:
“In any of the following circumstances which has led to the divorce 
of husband and wife, the innocent party shall be entitled to claim 
damages: a. bigamy; b. cohabitation between a person who has a 
spouse but cohabitates with a third person; c. domestic violence; d. 
maltreating or deserting any family member.”13
A divorce damage claim, as the moniker suggests, is a fault-based 
claim arising out of the commission by a spouse of any of the above-enu-
merated criminal and/or tortious conducts.  It provides distinctly separate 
statutory grounds to award damages to the innocent party whose spouse 
is bigamous, domestically violent, living together with another person or 
maltreating or deserting a family member and whose commission of the 
crime or the tort(s) directly and proximately caused the breakdown of 
the marriage.  The commission of the criminal and/or tortious acts must 
have caused bodily and/or mental injury to the other spouse.  The award 
of economic damages to the victim is meant to punish the criminal cul-
prit/wrongdoer and to recompense the injured party for the damages she 
has suffered.  The criminal/tort damage award is different from the pure 
economic compensation regime, discussed above, in that it is not rec-
ompense for performing domestic services or for rearing the child(ren) 
of the marriage, looking after the elderly, or assisting the other party in 
professional and career advancement.  It is penal and retributive.  It is dif-
ferent from the post–divorce financial assistance, to be analyzed in great 
detail infra, in that it is not need-based.  It is almost like strict liability.  If 
one party commits one of the specified crimes or torts, the abused party is 
on the statutory grounds of childrearing, caring for the elderly, and helping with the 
other spouse’s work.  Unfortunately, however, none of these fifteen petitioners came 
from families which had adopted a separate property system.  Therefore, the court re-
jected their claims on jurisdictional grounds.  But six out of the fifteen petitioners end-
ed up receiving some compensation purely through mediation.  One was to receive 
500 RMB per month for two years.  The rest walked away with one-lump payments 
ranging from 3,000 to 72,000 RMB.  Id. at 62.
12. 11 B.E. Witkin, Summary of California Law § 70 (11th ed. 2018).  The Leg-
islative Committee Report has this to say about this historic change:
The bulk of our divorce laws was established in 1872.  The plaintiff or 
cross-complainant was required to submit evidence to establish that 
at least one of a number of grounds for divorce existed.  The grounds 
were adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect, habitual 
intemperance and conviction of a felony.  Incurable insanity was later 
 added.
Id.
13. 2001 Marriage Law of China art. 46.
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automatically entitled to an award of damages.  American legal scholars 
maintain that the reintroduction of fault into the Chinese divorce laws 
is an attempt to “grapple with a high incidence of domestic violence and 
divorce followed by the feminization of poverty.”14
By contrast, under California divorce laws, except in the case of an 
attempted murder,15 marital fault plays no part in considering spousal 
support.  “In determining the need for, the amount of and the duration 
of spousal support under the Family Law Act, the court is to ignore mar-
ital fault and is to base its determination solely on the circumstances of 
the parties, including the duration of their marriage and the ability of the 
supported spouse to engage in gainful employment.”16
III. The Post–Divorce Financial Assistance Regime,  
the Most Significant of the Three Regimes,  
is Analogous but Not Equivalent to the American 
Concept of “Alimony” or “Spousal Support”
The Chinese law of post–divorce financial assistance, a sui generis 
set of rules, is something of an analogue, albeit not even a close one, to the 
American system of “alimony” or “spousal support,” for the reasons to be 
expatriated upon in the following pages.  Unlike divorce economic com-
pensation regime which is available only for families that have adopted a 
separate property system, the law of post–divorce financial assistance has 
no such limitation and is available to families that operate on the bases 
of both community-property and separate-property arrangements.  The 
law of post–divorce financial assistance is need-based.  It differs from the 
rule of divorce damage claim, which is a fault-based tort claim system. 
These three forms of financial relief are not mutually exclusive.  They 
operate conterminously.  They are applied on distinctly different factual 
and legal grounds and may be available to the same claimant if circum-
stances so justify.
A. Doctrinal Analysis of Article 42
The law is short, ambiguous, and painted with a broad brush. 
Without linguistic precision, it is hard to apply in judicial practice.  It is 
susceptible of multiple interpretations and hence subject to inconsistent 
14. Charles Ogletree & Rangita de Silva de Alwis, The Recently Revised Mar-
riage Law of China: The Promise and the Reality, 13 Tex. J. Women & L. 251, 254 (2004).
15. In addition to any other remedy authorized by law, when a spouse is convict-
ed of attempting to murder the other spouse, as punishable pursuant to subdivision 
(a) of Section 664 of the Penal Code, or of soliciting the murder of the other spouse, 
as punishable pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 653f of the Penal Code, the in-
jured spouse shall be entitled to a prohibition of any temporary or permanent award 
for spousal support or medical, life or other insurance benefits or payments from the 
injured spouse to the other spouse.
Cal. Fam. Code § 4324 (West 2013).
16. In re Marriage of Rosen, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 892 (1972); In re Marriage of 
Leib, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 636 n.4 (1978).
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and conflicting applications in terms of what constitutes “difficulties in 
life,” which is a prerequisite for invoking Article 42.  The judicial inter-
pretations17 published by the SPC of China to construe the tenor of the 
statute, offer the following not-very-illuminating guidelines:18
At the time of divorce, if one party is indeed experiencing difficul-
ties in life, according to Article 33 of the Marriage Law,19 the other 
party should render [the needy party] appropriate financial assis-
tance.  If the needy party is still young and can work for a living 
but is experiencing temporary hardships, the other party can render 
him or her short-term or one-time financial assistance.  When dealing 
with a marriage of many years, if one party is old, disabled, suffering 
from an illness or has lost his or her ability to work without means 
of sustenance, the other party should make proper arrangements in 
terms of housing and living support.  During the period of receiving 
such financial assistance, if the recipient party is remarried, the assist-
ing party may cease such assistance.  After completing the financial 
assistance originally ordered or agreed upon between the parties, no 
further assistance shall be rendered even though requested by the 
recipient party.20
The above judicial interpretations serve to clarify the following 
issues.  Financial assistance can be requested only at the time of divorce, 
not at any other time.  This point is made clear by the qualifying phrase 
“at the time of divorce” that begins the judicial interpretations.  It is 
short-term or one-time-based.  Recipient spouse’s remarriage terminates 
the support.  After the original judicially decreed or mutually agreed-
upon assistance is completed, no more support is available under the law 
even though requested by the needy party.  The concluding sentence also 
affirms the legislative intent that seeking and obtaining spousal support 
is a one-time deal, which is only available at the time of divorce, not avail-
able after divorce is finalized.  Even though the above Judicial Opinion 
of the SPC was published in 1984 construing Article 33 of the 1980 Mar-
riage Law, it is still followed by all the lower courts of China as binding 
17. Lei Shi, Balancing Different Rights in Families: Did the Third Judicial Inter-
pretation of Marriage Law of the PRC Achieve its Goals?, 27 Int’l J.L. Pol. & Fam.
381, 384 (2013) (“To some extent, judicial interpretations have the character of a 
source of law . . . courts, as the settlers of disputes, detect social change more directly 
and the procedures of judicial interpretations are much simpler than for legislation, so 
judicial interpretations can respond more quickly to social needs.”).
18. “Because the Marriage Law is very concise, many problems are left to the 
courts.  Therefore, Judicial Interpretations are usually regarded as guiding the judges 
in the lower courts in resolving these problems.  To some extent, they are as significant 
as the Marriage Law itself.”  Id.
19. Referring to the Marriage Law of 1980.
20. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing Minshi Zhengce Falü 
Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (最高人民法院关于贯彻执行民事政策法律若干问题的意见) 
[Judicial Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court of China on the Resolution of Cer-
tain Issues Pertaining to the Application of Civil Laws and Policies] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 30, 1984) art.  14, Baidu.com, https://baike.baidu.com 
[https://perma.cc/3ZP7-36RJ].
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authority because the 1980 marriage law was not repealed but rather was 
revised and amended in 2001.21
But exactly what kind of difficulties does one have to experience 
at the time of divorce in order to qualify for financial assistance from 
the other party?  The answer had to wait until December 24, 2001 when 
the Adjudicatory Committee of the SPC passed at its 120th meeting the 
“Judicial Interpretations Respecting Several Issues in the Application 
of the Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China.”22  Article  27 
of the above said Judicial Interpretations provides the following guid-
ance on point.
The phrase “difficulties in life a party experiences” referenced in 
Article 42 of the Marriage Law denotes the fact that this party cannot 
lead a basic life in his or her locality with her or his personal assets or 
with the portion of the property she or he gets following the division 
of community property.  After divorce, one party having no place to 
live meets the requirement of “difficulties in life.”  At divorce, when 
one party financially assists the other party using his or her personal 
assets such as a house, he or she can use either the right of posses-
sion or right of ownership at his or her disposal.23  [Emphasis added]
Hence, the entire corpus of China’s post–divorce financial assis-
tance law is comprised of Article 42 of the 2001 Marriage Law, the 1984 
SPC’s Judicial Opinions and Article 27 of the December 24, 2001 Judicial 
Interpretations issued by SPC.
Chinese alimony law has not reached the age of maturity, both 
literally and figuratively speaking.  Compared with the copious space 
dedicated to alimony and the exhaustive treatment of alimony-related 
issues in the California Family Code, Article  42 and SPC’s Judicial 
Comments are pathetically meager, vague and obsolete to address the 
practical needs of Chinese divorcees.
B. Defects of China’s Post–Divorce Financial Assistance System
The author sets out to examine China’s 2001 Marriage Law, which 
is already 18 years old as of this writing.  He cannot avoid examining 
its two precursors: Marriage Law of 1950, and the thirty-seven-year-old 
Marriage Law of 1980.  This is because the 2001 law is a revision of the 
1980 law, which in turn is a revision of the 1950 law.  All three sets of laws, 
21. The 1980 Marriage Law of China was adopted at the Third Session of the 
Fifth National People’s Congress on September 10, 1980 and was amended according 
to the “Decision on Amending the Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
on the 21st meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Con-
gress on April 28, 2001.
22. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Hunyin Fa” Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国婚姻
法》若干问题的解释) [Judicial Interpretations Respecting Several Issues in the Ap-
plication of the Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 24, 2001), Hualv.com, http://66law.cn/tiaoli/1190.aspx [https://
perma.cc/6HP5-KDF7].
23. Id. art. 27.
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being in pari materia, resemble each other so much that they are like trip-
lets, rather than blood relatives separated by generations in age.  In this 
Part, the author expounds some of the most salient defects inhering in 
China’s alimony laws.
1. The First Eligibility Criterion is Flawed
By the fair import of the Judicial Interpretations, one must meet 
one of the two criteria in order to qualify for post–divorce financial assis-
tance.  The first is that one “cannot lead a basic life in his or her locality” 
and the second is that one “has no place to live.”  Such antiquated judi-
cial guidelines ignore the already metamorphosed socioeconomic reality 
of China around the turn of the millennium when SPC issued them.  SPC 
failed miserably to contemplate the much-improved living conditions of 
the Chinese when its GDP became the world’s second largest in the 2010s.
China’s economy has grown by leaps and bounds since it opened its 
doors in 1978.  People’s living standard has risen to a new plateau since 
the turn of the twenty-first century.  Very few people would be so des-
titute after divorce that they cannot lead a basic life or has no place to 
live.  In 1980, China’s GDP was only $191.15 billion USD and its citizens’ 
annual per capita income was only about $195.24  In 2001 when China 
joined WTO and passed its current Marriage Law, its GDP increased 
seven times to $1,339.4 billion USD and its citizens’ annual per capita 
income rose nearly five and half times to $1,053.11.25  In July 2011, the 
World Bank Group ranked China as an upper-middle-income economy.26 
In 2017, China’s GDP jumped up to $12,237 billion USD, representing 
nearly 20 percent of the world economy while its citizens’ annual per 
capita income grew more than 45 times.27  The steep rise of people’s 
living standard rendered the first criterion obsolete and of little practical 
applicability.
2. The Second Eligibility Criterion is Equally Flawed
The provision concerning financial assistance is devoid of any seri-
ous purpose of practical applicability because its alternative requirement, 
i.e., “no roof over one’s head,” is also hard to meet.  China’s economic 
growth resulted in widespread social wealth, making it very unlikely that 
24. GDP (current US$), World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN&view=chart (last visited Nov. 8, 2018); GnI 
per capita, Atlas method (current US$), World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN&view=chart (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).
25. GDP (current US$), World Bank, supra note 24; GnI per capita, Atlas 
method (current US$), World Bank, supra note 24.
26. Changes in Country Classifications, World Bank: The Data Blog (July 1, 
2011), https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/changes-country-classifications [https://
perma.cc/74UX-D6JJ] (The World Bank in 2011 defined an upper-middle-income 
economy as having an average annual per capita income of between $3,976 and 
$12,275 USD).
27. GDP (current US$), World Bank, supra note 24; GnI per capita, Atlas 
method (current US$), World Bank, supra note 24.
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divorce would reduce a party to destitute homelessness.  Even if a divor-
cee does not have enough money to purchase housing, she can rent a 
place to live.  Moreover, her employer may provide her with a room at 
her work unit.  In the countryside, it does not take much money to build 
some simple abode.  Furthermore, Chinese culture and Chinese society 
still attach great importance to family values, family love, family ties and 
kinship.  The divorcee may very well be welcome to go to live with her 
parents, her aunt, her uncle, her brother, her sister, or her cousin.  In judi-
cial practice, the second criterion has little applicability as well.
3. Using One’s Housing to Assist the Needy Party is Impractical, 
Overly-Burdensome and Overly-Compensatory
Under Article  27 of the December 2001 Judicial Interpretations, 
“At divorce, when one party financially assists the other party using his 
personal assets such as a house, he or she can use either the right of pos-
session or right of ownership at his or her disposal.”  This guideline foists 
upon the assisting spouse an undue obligation that conflicts with his con-
stitutionally guaranteed absolute property right.  Like Americans, to 
most Chinese, a house or a condo unit is the most valuable capital asset 
or capital investment.  Particularly following the division of community 
property and reaffirmation of separate property rights in real property, as 
memorialized in a divorce decree, it would be unreasonable and unfair 
for the property owner spouse to either yield right of possession or the 
right of ownership to the needy party.  Hence, the requirement to finan-
cially assist the needy party with one’s real property, by the conveyance 
of either the right of possession or the right of ownership, runs contrary 
to the inviolability of one’s private property rights sanctified and pro-
tected by China’s Property Laws.  Furthermore, most Chinese couples 
only own one house or one condo unit.  If the owner spouse gives pos-
session of the housing to the needy party, he would be without a roof 
above his head.  If he rents one room out of his flat to the ex-spouse or 
permits her to continue to live in a room for free as suggested by Pro-
fessor Guodong Xu,28 they would be living under the same roof again, 
which defeats the purpose of their divorce.  If he is required to convey 
ownership right to the needy party, it would constitute undue burden to 
the supporting ex-spouse and overcompensation to the supported, which 
is unfair and inequitable and defeats the purpose of the post–divorce 
financial assistance regime.  For these reasons it is the most unpopular 
element of the entire post–divorce financial assistance regime because it 
has rarely been applied.29  Essentially all post–divorce financial assistance 
was offered and accepted in cash.  Rarely is it in the form of realty.30
28. Xu Guodong (徐国栋), Lüse Minfa Dian Caoan (绿色民法典草案) [Green 
Civil Code Draft] 203 (2004).  The author is a law professor at Xiamen University Law 
School, China.
29. Chen et al., supra note 11.
30. Id.
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4. An Arithmetic Formula Needs to Be Developed to Calculate 
the Proper Amount of Post–Divorce Financial Assistance
Since it is impractical to offer financial assistance in the form of 
realty, cash payment is the most convenient way of rendering support. 
Instead of guessing the proper amount of post–divorce financial assis-
tance or simply pulling a number out of the thin air, a scientific arithmetic 
formula should be developed.  The formula should be modeled after Dis-
soMaster, the software program that California family law judges and 
lawyers utilize in computing the amount of spousal support, taking into 
account parties’ income, living expenses, mandatory retirement contribu-
tions, spousal support or child support obligations from prior marriages 
or relations, health insurance premiums, itemized deductions and/or hard-
ship deductions.  Furthermore, a general rule of thumb like Santa Clara 
County Court Rule 3.C can serve as a guideline for the judges.  Under 
Rule 3.C, if a supported spouse is not receiving child support, she or he is 
entitled to 40 percent of the net income of the supporting party minus 50 
percent of the net income of the supported spouse.31  As an illustration, 
assuming that the husband’s net monthly income is RMB 10,000 RMB 
and the wife’s net monthly income is 5,000 RMB, all else being equal, the 
wife is entitled to a monthly financial support of 1,500 RMB. [(10,000 
× 40%) – (5,000 × ½) = 4,000 – 2,500 = 1,500].  If the husband makes 
RMB10,000 and the wife makes zero income, then the wife is entitled to 
RMB4,000 in monthly post–divorce financial assistance. [(10,000 × 40%) 
– 0 = 4,000 – 0 =4,000].
5. Scholarly Empirical Research Shows That Only 5 Percent 
of Divorcees Benefited From the Post–Divorce Financial 
Assistance Regime
Studies show that approximately 95 percent of the divorcees did 
not avail themselves of the statutory financial assistance regime.  Most of 
those who benefited are the elderly, the disabled, the mentally or phys-
ically-ill, the unemployed, the retired, the homeless and the illiterate.32
A pioneering tripartite study was undertaken by Professor Yinlan 
Xia33 right after the passage of the 2001 Marriage Law.  She found that, 
from May 2001 to December 2002, out of a total 1,302 divorce cases filed 
and adjudicated in the No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing, only 
95 cases, namely 7.3 percent, involved post–divorce financial assistance. 
Out of the 95 assisted/supported parties in the 95 cases, 86 were women, 
making up 90.8 percent while only seven were men.  Professor Xia also 
31. Practice Under the California Family Code: Dissolution, Legal Separa-
tion, Nullity 179 (M. Dee Samuels & Frederick A. Mandabach eds., 2008 ed.).
32. Wang Geya (王歌雅), Lihun Jiuji Zhidu: Shijian yu Fansi (离婚救济制度：
实践与反思) [Divorce Relief System: Practice and Reflection], Faxue Luntan (法学论
坛), Mar. 2011, at 30.
33. Yinlan Xia is a law professor at China University of Political Science and 
Law in Beijing.
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surveyed 439 divorce cases filed and decided in Harbin34 Intermediate 
People’s Court during the same time and found that only 24 cases, i.e., 
5.46 percent, involved post–divorce financial assistance.  Out of the 24 
assisted/supported parties in the 24 cases, 22 were women, while only two 
were men.  Professor Xia’s study culminated in her final review of 200 
divorce cases decided during the same time period in the southern city of 
Xiamen, across the strait from Taiwan.  She found that only five cases, 2.5 
percent, involved post–financial assistance.35
Six years later in 2008, Professor Geya Wang36 conducted a sim-
ilar empirical study of 143 divorce cases from Beijing and 120 divorce 
cases from Harbin.  Professor Wang found that the number of parties that 
sought and obtained post–divorce financial assistance was three in Bei-
jing and six in Harbin.37
In 2014, three scholars published the results of a much more 
comprehensive empirical study of not only the post–divorce financial 
assistance regime, but also of the economic compensation at divorce and 
the divorce damage claims regimes.38  The three researchers studied 120 
divorce judgments from each of the three years between 2010 and 2012 
for a total of 360 cases decided in Chongqing, located in the southwestern 
part of China.  They discovered that out of the 360 cases, only 11 cases 
petitioned for post–divorce financial assistance on the statutory basis of 
Article 42, accounting for only 3.1 percent.  Out of the 11 petitions, five 
were rejected by the court “based on no factual or judicial grounds.”39 
Of the remaining six petitioners who were awarded financial assistance, 
only one received it via a court decree.  She had requested 53,000 RMB 
(approx. $8,000 USD) but the court reduced it to 6,000 RMB (equivalent 
to $900  USD).  The other five received financial assistance via medi-
ated settlement, receiving 100,000, 48,000, 6,000, 5,000 and 1,000 RMB, 
respectively.40  It is noteworthy that all received the post–divorce finan-
cial assistance in cash and that none of them received it by way of 
housing assistance.
6. The Protection of the Alimony Law is Skewed to Benefit 
Far More Women than Men
Most of the support applicants are women41 probably because Chi-
nese women have traditionally played the role of household managers, 
caretakers of children and the elderly, stay-home supporters of their 
34. Capital city of Heilongjiang Province in Northeast China.
35. Xia Yinlan (夏吟兰), Lihun Ziyou yu Xianzhi Lun 245 (离婚自由与限制
论) [Divorce Freedom and Limitation] (2007).
36. Geya Wang is a law professor of Heilongjiang University Law School, China.
37. Wang, supra note 32, at 30.
38. Chen et al, supra note 11.
39. Id. at 61.
40. Id.
41. Xia, supra note 35, at 245.  Approximately 90.8 percent of post–divorce fi-
nancial assistance beneficiaries are women.
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husbands’ careers, rather than bread winners.  Women also tend to be 
more disadvantaged financially by divorce due to limited marketable job 
skills.42  Surveys show substantial differentials between women’s income 
and men’s income.  One study indicated that in 1989 in China’s cities and 
townships, the average income of women was 77.5 percent of that of men 
and that 10 years later in 1999, the average income of women dropped 
to 70.1 percent of that of men.  Another study of the disparity between 
women’s income and men’s income in Shanghai found out that in 1989, 
the average income of women was 80 percent of that of men and that 10 
years later in 1999, the average income of women fell to 73 percent of 
that of men.  In 2007, a survey conducted by the Center for Women Stud-
ies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences revealed that the average 
income of women interviewed was only 63 percent of that of men.43  What 
is worse, these indigent litigants who seek support often appear in propria 
persona and do not comprehend the substantive law; much less do they 
know how to navigate the labyrinth of the court rules and procedures.
The meager spousal support amount awarded divorcees has the 
effect of inhibiting women from untying the knot and from breaking free 
from the shackles of unhappy marriages and their unfortunate circum-
stances.  Cynics may argue that this situation promotes stability of the 
family unit and promotes the state’s policy of achieving a self-supporting 
society.  Under Chairman Mao, women enjoyed equal social and polit-
ical status as, if not higher than, men.  “Women holding up half of the 
sky” was the slogan popular in Mao’s days.  Some women who grew up 
under the rule of Mao might feel simply too proud to “beg for” financial 
assistance from men, which is another contributing factor to the low per-
centage of divorcees seeking spousal support.
7. The Standard of “Inability to Lead a Basic Life”  
and “Nowhere to Live” Should be Superseded  
by the “Standard of Living Established During Marriage”
China’s NPC should abrogate “the inability to afford basic sub-
sistence” and “nowhere to live” criteria for invoking the post–divorce 
financial assistance law and supersede them with “the standard of living 
established during marriage,” a benchmark generally employed by judges 
in California and in the United States.  Instead of being the last resort a 
divorcee turns to before becoming a vagrant, the revised new spousal 
support statute should make sure that, in addition to providing the other 
party with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing and shel-
ter over her head, it should also ensure that she or he enjoys the same 
42. Wang Geya (王歌雅), Jingji Bangzhu Zhidu de Shehui Xingbie Fenxi (经济
帮助制度的社会性别分析) [Analysis About the Social Gender with Economic Assis-
tance System], Faxue Zazhi (法学杂志), no. 7, 2010, at 69.
43. Xu Anqi (徐安琪), Zhuanxiqi Jiating Xingbie Juese yishi de Bianqian (转型
期家庭性别角色意识的变迁) [Changes in Family Gender Role Awareness], in NüxiNg 
de SheNgcuN ZhuaNgkuaNg he Shehui xiNtai (女性的生存状况和社会心态) [Wom-
en’s Living Conditions and Social Mentality] 182, 205 (Meng Xianfan ed., 2010).
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standard of living established during her marriage as provided for under 
California Family Code § 4330(a).44  Even if the divorcee is able to sur-
vive on her own means, she is still entitled to spousal support.
In California and in many other states, multimillionaire divorcees 
are still awarded huge sums in spousal support.  In the well-publicized 
divorce case of former Los Angeles Lakers basketball star Kobe Bryant, 
his wife Vanessa Bryant was going to be awarded an annual alimony 
of $1 million, plus $18.8 million in property settlement and $365,000 
in monthly child support if they had gone through with their divorce.45 
Another example to illustrate this point is the case of President Donald 
Trump when he divorced his second wife, Ivana Zelnicek Trump.  When 
everything was said and done, Ivana Trump walked away with $350,000 
in annual alimony after Donald Trump paid her $14 million in property 
settlement and promised to pay her $350,000 per year for child support 
to continue her life style as a multimillionaire that she was accustomed to 
during her marriage with the real estate mogul.46
C. Chinese Alimony Laws Should Be Revised to Close the Loopholes 
and Fill the Gaps
1. Institute Financial Support Orders Pendente Lite, Including 
Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs
The 2001 Marriage Law of China and its two Judicial Interpreta-
tions are silent on the issue of whether the divorcing parties can apply 
for and have the court issue an order to obtain financial assistance during 
the pendency of divorce proceedings.  This is in sharp contrast to the 
California law explicitly authorizing the court to issue support orders 
during the pendency of any proceeding for dissolution of marriage.47 
Actually, the applicant can obtain a support order pendente lite within 
a couple of months of filing the divorce petition.  Its purpose, inter alia, 
44. In a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, 
the court may order a party to pay for the support of the other party an amount, for a 
period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard 
of living established during the marriage . . . .
Cal. Fam. Code § 4330(a) (West 2013).
45. Andrew J. Botros, Kobe Bryant May have Been Facing $1.36 Million in 
Monthly Spousal and Child Support Payments if Divorce Went Through, Larry Brown 
Sports (Jan. 14, 2013), http://larrybrownsports.com/everything-else/kobe- bryant-
spousal-child-support-divorce [https://perma.cc/X7L8-2MPK]; Michael Reicher, Kobe 
Bryant Divorce: Wife vanessa gets $18.8 Million in Property, L.A. Times (Jan. 21, 2012, 
6:10 AM), https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/01/kobe-bryant-divorce-wife-
vanessa-gets-188-million-in-property.html [https://perma.cc/2LZC-NSKC].
46. Richard D. Hylton, Trumps Settle: She Gets $14 Million Plus, N.Y. Times 
(Mar. 21, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/21/nyregion/trumps-settle-she-gets-
14-million-plus.html [https://perma.cc/2C82-884U].
47. “During the pendency of any proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for 
legal separation of the parties . . . the court may order . . . (a) either spouse to pay any 
amount that is necessary for the support of the other spouse . . . .”  Cal. Fam. Code 
§ 3600 (West 2004).
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is to assist a spouse to live in substantially the same manner to which he 
or she had become accustomed.48  It is also to provide the less financially 
able spouse with the financial means to properly litigate that spouse’s 
side of the controversy.49  The new proposed law would provide support 
solely based on the respective parties’ current income.50  Attorney fees 
and court costs ought to be awarded to the financially less-able party 
for her to have equal access to legal representation, to level the play-
ing field, and to enable him or her to maintain or defend the proceeding 
during its pendency.  The proposed provision respecting award of attor-
ney’s fees and court costs could be modeled after California Family Code 
sections 2030(a)(1) & (2).51
The award of temporary financial support and attorney’s fees & 
costs to the party who is at a financial disadvantage will help balance 
the otherwise unequal economic powers.  It will tip the balance in favor 
of justice and equity by affording the recipient spouse some economic 
leverage.  It will make her stand on her feet, and equally equip her to fight 
for her rights to child custody, visitation, child support, division of com-
munity property, and pursue her rights to economic compensation and 
divorce damages.
2. The Proposed New Law Should Require the Supporting 
Spouse to Make Provisions for the Supported Spouse  
in Case of the Death of Either Party
Another glaring loophole is the conspicuous absence of a provision 
in China’s alimony law specifying what happens to the support obliga-
tion in case of the death of one of the parties.  Article 27 of the “Judicial 
Interpretations” of Article  42 of the 2001 Marriage Law explains that 
48. In re Marriage of Winter, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1926, 1932 (1992).
49. In re Estate of Fawcett, 232 Cal. App. 2d 770, 784 (1965); Heller v. Heller, 88 
Cal. App. 2d 603, 606 (1948).
50. Marriage of Winter, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1933.
51. (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or le-
gal separation of the parties, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related 
judgment, the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation, 
including access early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if 
necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a government 
entity, to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is 
reasonably necessary for the attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defend-
ing the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.
 (2) When a request for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall 
make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section 
is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and 
whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties.  If the find-
ings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order 
awarding attorney’s fees and costs.  A party who lacks the financial ability to hire an 
attorney may request, as an in pro per litigant, that the court order the other party, if 
that other party has the financial ability, to pay a reasonable amount to allow the un-
represented party to retain an attorney in a timely manner before proceedings in the 
matter go forward.  Cal. Fam. Code § 2030 (West 2004).
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remarriage of the supported spouse terminates the support but is silent 
as to what legal effect death of the obligor party has on the support obli-
gation.  This huge void in the law creates ambiguity and perplexity to 
judges, but at the same time confers on them unfettered power to do 
whatever they want.  This is certainly another instance of the rule of man 
at work.  It results in unequal and inconsistent application of the alimony 
laws.  It may breed abuses and injustices.
Generally speaking, the obligation to pay spousal support is a 
personal responsibility.  Death of one of the parties extinguishes the per-
sonal responsibility under contract law.  Under California Family Law, 
death of one of the parties terminates the obligation of support unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties in writing.52  However, even without a 
written agreement, the court may order the supporting spouse to main-
tain life insurance naming the supported party as beneficiary, purchase 
an annuity for the supported spouse, or establish a trust to provide for 
the support of the supported spouse, so that the death of the supporting 
spouse will not leave the supported party in the lurch.53
Moreover, a proposed provision should provide for the supported 
spouse in the event of the death of the supporting spouse because, unlike 
their American counterparts, the supported spouses in China are com-
prised mostly of the elderly, the disabled, the mentally or physically-ill, 
the unemployed, the retired, the homeless and the illiterate,54 90.8 per-
cent of which are women.55  The new provision that fills the void should 
require the supporting spouse to take one or a combination of the fol-
lowing affirmative actions: (i) purchase a life insurance policy on the life 
of the supporting spouse; (ii) purchase an annuity contract; (iii) establish 
a trust; and naming the supported spouse as beneficiary in each of the 
three scenarios.  Failing the above, the court may require that the estate 
of the supporting spouse be responsible for the remainder of the sup-
port obligation.
52. “Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of a 
party under an order for the support of the other party terminates upon the death of 
either party or the remarriage of the other party.”  Cal. Fam. Code § 4337 (West 2013).
53.  [W]here it is just and reasonable in view of the circumstances of the parties, 
the court, in determining the needs of a supported spouse, may include an amount suf-
ficient to purchase an annuity for the supported spouse or to maintain life insurance 
for the benefit of the supported spouse on the life of the spouse required to make 
the payment of support, or may require the spouse required to make the payment of 
support to establish a trust to provide for the support of the supported spouse, so that 
the supported spouse will not be left without means of support in the event that the 
spousal support is terminated by the death of the party required to make the payment 
of support.
Cal. Fam. Code § 4060 (West 2013).
54. See Wang, supra note 32.
55. See Xia, supra note 35.
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3. The Ability to Pay Support Should be Part  
of the Alimony Law
Another gaping hole in China’s current post–divorce financial 
assistance law is the omission of the ability to pay support, which cre-
ates so much ambiguity.  It is another gap that the lower court judges are 
called upon to fill given their unfettered discretionary power.  The cur-
rent financial assistance law and the judicial interpretations insist on the 
other party rendering the needy party appropriate financial assistance 
without considering the relevant issue of whether the other party has 
the ability to render the required financial assistance or not.  The abil-
ity to pay support is not only a relevant factor but also a threshold issue 
to decide before the court can issue a financial support order.  In deter-
mining the amount of spousal support, a California court is instructed to 
consider many factors enumerated in the Family Code from (a) through 
(n), including (c) the ability of the supporting party to pay spousal sup-
port; (d) needs of each party based on the standard of living established 
during marriage; (e) the obligations and assets of each party: (f) duration 
of marriage; (g) ability of supported party to engage in gainful employ-
ment; (h) parties’ age and health, etc.56
In an early case, the California Supreme Court held that a trial 
court’s refusal to consider evidence of lack of ability to pay support con-
stituted prejudicial error requiring reversal of the support order.57  On 
the other hand, when a husband quit his higher-paying job after separa-
tion and took up a lower-paying job just to avoid paying spousal support, 
the court awarded the wife support on the basis of his earning capacity. 
The court imputed to him a higher income commensurate with his earn-
ing ability rather than using his actual lower earnings in calculating the 
amount of support.58  California Family Code § 4320(a) and (c) instruct 
the court to take into account the spouses’ respective earning capaci-
ties in determining spousal support.59  California Supreme Court defined 
“earning capacity” to mean the level of income that a spouse is reasonably 
capable of earning on the basis of his or her age, health, education, mar-
ketable skills, employment history, and the availability of the necessary 
56. Cal. Fam. Code § 4320 (West 2013).
57. Arnold v. Arnold, 215 Cal. 613, 614–15 (1932).
58. Meagher v. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 63–65 (1961).
59.  [T]he extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to 
maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account 
all the following:
 (1) the marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for 
those skills; the time and expenses required for training to develop those 
skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, 
more marketable skills or employment.
 (2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earn-
ing capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred 
during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to do-
mestic duties.
Cal. Fam. Code § 4320 (West 2013).
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employment opportunities.60  Courts, however, historically base sup-
port on actual income.  But when the supporting spouse, in bad faith, 
purposely tries to shirk his or her obligation of support by quitting or 
refusing to seek or accept gainful employment, intentionally not applying 
himself to business, or willfully reducing his income to an artificial level, 
courts will calculate the support amount on the basis of earning capacity 
instead of actual income.61
California Family Code section 4320 with its enumerated factors 
to be considered for purposes of determining spousal support, and the 
above cited California case law provide suitable paradigms for formulat-
ing a provision concerning the ability to pay financial assistance to fill the 
void in China’s post–divorce financial assistance law.
4. The Court Should Retain Jurisdiction to Modify, Extend  
or Terminate Post–Divorce Financial Assistance Based  
on Material Change of Circumstances
Article  14 of the 1984 SPC’s Judicial Opinions unambiguously 
limits the availability of financial assistance to the time of divorce and 
permanently and inalterably cuts it off after the completion of the “orig-
inal judicially decreed or mutually agreed-upon financial assistance.”62 
The law is not only rigid and inflexible but also unsympathetic and inhu-
man.  People’s fortunes and circumstances change with the passage of 
time.  Therefore, this author suggests that a revamped Chinese alimony 
law would mandate that in a marriage of ten years or more the court 
shall retain indefinitely both personal jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction for the divorce case to award new support, modify or termi-
nate existing support upon showing of material changes of circumstances. 
This would bring the Chinese post–divorce financial assistance law on 
a par with its California counterpart.63  Of course the parties can waive 
their respective right to receive post–divorce financial assistance from 
each other permanently and request that the court terminate jurisdiction 
to award financial assistance in the future if they act in an intelligent and 
well-informed manner.  The parties can also choose to relinquish financial 
assistance for the time being and pray for the court to reserve jurisdiction 
to award financial support in the future in case one’s financial situation 
60. In re Marriage of Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th 225, 234 (1992).
61. Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121 (1971); see also In re Marriage of 
Meegan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 156, 163 (1992).
62. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing Minshi Zhengce Falü 
Ruogan Wenti de Yijian, supra note 20, art. 14.
63. (a) Except on written agreement of the parties to the contrary or a court 
order terminating spousal support, the court retains jurisdiction indefinitely in a pro-
ceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties where the 
marriage is of long duration.
 (b) For the purpose of retaining jurisdiction, there is a presumption affect-
ing the burden of producing evidence that a marriage of 10 years or more, from the 
date of marriage to the date of separation, is a marriage of long duration . . . .
Cal. Fam. Code. § 4336 (West 2013).
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materially changes such as losing one’s job, becoming ill or disabled. 
Material change of circumstances shall also include getting a higher-pay-
ing job, one’s company going public and winning the lottery, which will 
be grounds for reducing, increasing, extending or terminating previously 
ordered financial assistance.  The recommended revision to the Chinese 
post–divorce financial assistance law should also include the prerogative 
of the parties to enter into a written agreement at the time of divorce that 
cancels the legal effects of death, remarriage and cohabitation, extends 
the support obligation beyond death, remarriage and cohabitation,64 and 
provides for the nonmodifiability and/or irrevocability of an agreement 
for spousal support.65  This is probably wishful thinking.  It is simply too 
rosy a picture being painted of the current Chinese legislators.66
5. Strengthen Enforcement Mechanisms to Compel Compliance 
With Judicial Decree or Marital Settlement Agreement  
Re Post–Divorce Financial Assistance
The enforcement of post–divorce financial assistance as judi-
cially ordered or mutually agreed upon between the parties is vaguely 
and briefly mentioned in Article 48 of the 2001 Marriage Law, lumped 
together with enforcement of other rights of property division, property 
inheritance and child visitation.  Article 48 states: “In case any person 
refuses to execute the judgment or decision on the payment of expenses 
for upbringing, supporting or maintenance, the partitioning or inheri-
tance of property or visiting the children, the execution may be enforced 
by the people’s court in accordance with the law.  Relevant persons and 
entities shall be responsible for giving assistance to the enforcement.”
This lackluster enforcement provision is symptomatically vague, 
imprecise and indefinite and devoid of any concrete rules and procedures 
necessary to compel performance of the support obligation.  It is sug-
gested that Chinese post–divorce financial assistance law be rewritten to 
include the following devices as remedies to the obligee spouse.
a. Earnings Assignment Order
When the parties execute an agreement regarding the amount and 
specific method of post–divorce financial assistance with the supervision 
64. See California Family Code § 4323(a)(1), which provides:
Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, there is a rebut-
table presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for 
spousal support if the supported party is cohabiting with a nonmarital 
partner.  Upon a determination that circumstances have changed, the 
court may modify or terminate the spousal support . . . .
Cal. Fam. Code § 4323(a)(1) (West 2013).
65. “An agreement for spousal support may not be modified or revoked to the 
extent that a written agreement, or, if there is no written agreement, an oral agreement 
entered into in open court between the parties, specifically provides that the spou-
sal support is not subject to modification or termination.”  Cal. Fam. Code § 3591(c) 
(West 2004).
66. See discussion, infra, of stumbling blocks to reforming China’s alimony law.
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of the judge as a mediator or when the court issues a financial assistance 
decree as part of a divorce judgment, the court should issue a concom-
itant earnings assignment order, which shall be served on the obligor 
spouse’s employer, mandating the said employer to make monthly or 
semimonthly deductions of that portion of the obligor spouse’s salary or 
wages to be paid over directly to the obligee spouse’s bank account, as 
ongoing payment of the post–divorce financial assistance until the sup-
port obligation is fulfilled.67
b. Order to Attach a Security Lien on Paying Spouse’s Separate 
Property
In cases where the obligor spouse is a self-employed entrepreneur, 
professional or sole proprietor owner and operator of a business and the 
enforcement of an earnings assignment order is impractical, the court 
may order the obligor spouse to give reasonable security for payment of 
the post–divorce financial assistance by allowing the court to impress a 
lien on the supporting spouse’s separate property, including community 
property awarded to him, to secure payment of the financial support until 
such time as the support obligation is discharged in toto.68
c. Imposing Monetary Penalties on Delinquent Support 
Payments, Issuance of Writ of Execution, Levying Obligor’s 
Bank Account, non-Issuance and non-Renewal  
of Professional Licenses
If and when the obligor spouse becomes delinquent in the support 
payments, the obligee spouse ought to be authorized under the statute to 
file and serve a notice of delinquency stating the amount of arrears under 
oath and request that the court impose a monetary penalty at 10 per-
cent interest rate to accrue on the arrearages.  The obligee spouse should 
be able to obtain a judgment for the unpaid amounts plus the interest 
accruals and enforce the said judgment via court’s issuance of a writ of 
execution, which is to be turned over to the law enforcement division of 
the county or district, who shall serve as the levying officer to levy on the 
obligor spouse’s bank account.  The new law should authorize non-is-
suance, non-renewal, suspension or revocation of drivers’ licenses and 
professional licenses for real estate brokers and agents, insurance brokers 
67. California legislature instructs courts to include an earnings assignment or-
der in any support orders.
 (a) When the court orders a party to pay an amount for support or 
orders a modification of the amount of support to be paid, the court shall 
include in its order an earnings assignment order for support that orders 
the employer of the obligor to pay to the obligee that portion of the obli-
gor’s earnings due or to become due in the future as will be sufficient to 
pay an amount to cover both of the following: (1) The amount ordered by 
the court for support. (2) An amount which shall be ordered by the court 
to be paid toward the liquidation of any arrearage.
Cal. Fam. Code § 5230 (West 2013).
68. “The court may order the supporting party to give reasonable security for 
payment of spousal support.”  Cal. Fam. Code § 4339 (West 2013).
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and agents, lawyers, doctors, CPAs, financial analysts, etc. if they are delin-
quent on their post–divorce financial assistance payments.  Under the 
new law, courts should be empowered to hold the delinquent obligor 
spouses in contempt of court order and sentence them to jail time if their 
disobedience of the court order is willful and otherwise unjustified and 
inexcusable.
IV. Stumbling Blocks to Reforming China’s Post–Divorce 
Financial Assistance System
One must not overlook the enormity and complexity of the mis-
sion of reforming China’s alimony laws, each proposed provision being 
res nova.  One of the reasons for the government’s inertia and stasis to 
respond to the demands of the fast-changing times is the disparate shift-
ing policies that SPC’s different presidents adopt during their successive 
reigns.69  These inconsistent policies’ focus changes from experimentation 
with the adversarial trial system, to mediation, and to social harmony 
and stability over the individuals’ legal rights.70  As a matter of fact, the 
current overarching goal of the State is to promote social stability and 
social harmony, not the passage and application of an elaborate set of 
particularized rules of law.  Judges are under pressure to mediate cases 
rather than try them because mediation is less formal, less adversarial 
and less confrontational.  This corollary might be ascribed to the triumph 
of Confucianism over Legalism, and the concomitant ascendancy of the 
rule of man to the expense of the rule of law, as manifested in contempo-
rary China.  The success of the mission to reform China’s alimony laws 
requires far more than the technical lawyering and drafting talents.  It 
hinges on overcoming resistance emanating from Confucianism and the 
Party-state’s overemphasis on mediation.  To contextualize the current 
conundrum of mediation vis-à-vis adjudication, it is necessary to reexam-
ine the historical dichotomy between Confucianism and Legalism and 
the resultant struggle of rule of man against rule of law.
A. The Conflict Between Confucianism and Legalism and the Resultant  
Rule of Man Competing Against Rule of Law
The clash between Confucianism and Legalism led to the strug-
gle of rule of man against rule of law, with the former dominating for 
more than two thousand years of Chinese political, philosophical and 
legal history.  In imperial China, law was the embodiment of ethical 
norms of Confucianism.71  Protecting the economic rights of one indi-
vidual against another individual was only the ancillary function of law.72 
Confucian belief dictated that government by law should always be kept 
69. Kwai Hang Ng & Xin He, Chinese Courts as Embedded Institutions, in Em-
bedded Courts: Judicial Decision Making in China 1, 3 (2017).
70. Id.
71. Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China 5 (1967).
72. Id. at 4.
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secondary to government by moral precept and example.73  Confucius 
himself is attributed with saying “[l]ead the people by regulations, keep 
them in order by punishments, and they will flee from you and lose all 
self-respect.”74 Therefore, dispute resolution in China relied heavily on 
extralegal bodies, channels, and procedures, rather than the formal judi-
cial system.75
The following passage from huai-nan-tzu76 metaphorically and viv-
idly describes the relationship, in Confucianist views, between rule of 
man by benevolent and righteous examples and rule of law.
A good government is one that takes benevolence (jen) and social 
rightness (yi) as its basic roots, and laws (fa) and regulations (tu) 
as its lesser twigs . . . .  He who gives priority to the roots, but only 
secondary place to the twigs, is termed a Superior Man (chun-tzu), 
whereas he who lets his concern for the twigs result in damage to 
the roots is termed a petty man (hsiao jen)  .  .  .  .   To ignore culti-
vation of the roots while devoting effort to the twigs is to neglect 
the trunk while giving water to the branches.  Law, moreover, has its 
birth in the upholding of benevolence and social rightness, so that to 
lay great weight on law while discarding social rightness is to value 
one’s cap and shoes while forgetting one’s head and feet.77
By contrast, the thrust of the Legalists’ arguments is that law is the 
basis of stable government because it provides precision in measuring 
individual conduct.  Li (rituals) cannot do this because they are unwrit-
ten and subject to subjective interpretation.78  The legalists argue that the 
li of the ancients were no longer congruent with modern conditions and 
should be superseded by a system of law.  They argue that law should be 
responsive to the shifting needs of its times in order to retain its vital-
ity.  They further argue that harsh laws result in reduction of government 
and a society free from conflict and oppression.79  Han Fei Tzu, the chief 
framer and proponent of Legalism, offers the following dicta that are 
aptly instructive for our present purpose of revamping China’s outdated 
alimony laws:
For governing the people there is no permanent principle save that it 
is the laws (fa) and nothing else that determine the government.  Let 
the laws roll with the times and there will be good government.  Let 
the government accord with the age and there will be great achieve-
ment . . . .  But let times shift without any alteration in the laws and 
there will be disorder . . . .  This is why, in the sage’s governing of men, 
the laws shift with the times . . . .80
73. Id. at 18.
74. Id. at 21–22.
75. Id. at 6.
76. It is also spelled Huainanzi according to modern-day Pinyin spelling.
77. Huai nan-tzu (淮南子), 20:21b-22, quoted in Bodde & Morris, supra note 
71, at 23.
78. Bodde & Morris, supra note 71, at 23.
79. Id. at 24.
80. Han Fei Tzu, Complete Works (W.K. Liao trans. Probsthain 1939), quoted 
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If the Chinese legislators are still looking for inspiration and guid-
ance as to how to reform China’s alimony laws, look no further.  The 
ancient sages already laid down the course of action: “Let the laws roll 
with the times” and “let the government accord with the age.”  Chi-
na’s current post–divorce financial relief laws date back to 2001 and fell 
behind the times.  Reform is overdue.
B. The Synthesists’ views versus the Thin Theories of Rule of Law
Consequent to the triumph of Confucianism over Legalism is the 
predominance of the rule of man over the rule of law throughout the 
dynastic periods.  Following China’s reform and opening up in 1978, 
legal scholars vehemently debated the merits of rule of law versus rule 
of man.81  Those who adopt the rule of the golden mean are the synthe-
sists who believe that law by itself is not sufficient to govern and that 
every social system is an amalgamation of laws and human beings who 
are necessary to the creation, interpretation, and implementation of laws. 
Rather, the law must be supplemented by morality, education, and CCP 
leadership.82  In his 2002 book, Professor Peerenboom gave a precis of the 
essential constitutive elements of the thin theory of rule of law as follows: 
procedural rules for lawmaking, transparency of laws that must be made 
public and readily accessible, general applicability of laws, clearness of 
laws, laws being prospective rather than retroactive, laws being consistent 
on the whole, fair application of the laws, enforcement of the laws, and 
laws’ reasonable acceptance to a majority of the populace.83
The dynamics in reforming China’s post–divorce financial relief 
laws would be shaped by a convergence of the synthesists’ views and the 
thin theories of rule of law.  In light of China’s longstanding political 
distrust of law and the scholarly opinion that China is retreating from 
political and legal reform and that China has turned against law,84 it 
would take many more years or generations to firmly anchor the rule of 
law in the collective consciousness of the politicians, the lawmakers, the 
jurists, and the populace who stand to be the stakeholders in and benefi-
ciaries from such reform.
Conclusion
Does China have alimony laws?  The answer is both yes and no. 
Yes, because China has a regime not dissimilar to the American concept 
of “alimony,” albeit crude and vague in form and substance.  No, because 
in Bodde & Morris, supra note 71, at 25.
81. Randall Peerenboom, Post-Mao Reforms: Competing Conceptions of Rule 
of Law, in China’s Long March Toward the Rule of Law 55, 56 (2002).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 65.
84. See e.g., Carl Minzner, End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Re-
vival Is Undermining Its Rise (2018); Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping 
Era, 20 Asia Pol., July 2015, at 4, 4; Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 935 (2011).
138 Vol. 36:113PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL
China’s post–divorce financial relief laws, outdated and obsolete, are a far 
cry from its California counterparts and exceedingly inadequate to meet 
the current needs of litigants.  They were enacted when China’s annual 
per capita income was only $195 USD and now that figure has jumped to 
more than $8,826.99 USD.  The law’s investiture of the lower court judges 
with the overly-broad discretionary powers, owing to the innumerable 
loopholes and gaps in the law, naturally impedes its uniform and equal 
application across the board.  These loopholes leave open the back door 
for abuses and grafting, which is the inevitable byproduct of the rule of 
man, as opposed to the rule of law.  If the gaps in the law and obstacles to 
its implementation are not addressed, the law will remain largely symbol-
ic.85  Therefore, a major overhaul is overdue for the law to keep pace and 
to comport with the current socioeconomic reality.
However, reforming China’s post–divorce financial relief laws is a 
daunting mission for historical and contemporary reasons.  With Confu-
cianist rule of man dominating the collective consciousness, each SPC 
president has favored different policies and approaches.86  An adversarial 
trial system was introduced in the 1990s aiming at prosecuting the indi-
viduals’ rights to the fullest extent possible under the law, which would 
require an elaborate set of particularized rules of law, both substantive 
and procedural.  Then, “the pendulum swung to the other end as media-
tion was prioritized in the 2000s.”87  Between 2008 and 2013, when Wang 
Shengjun was the SPC’s president, the policy reverted to traditionalism, 
favoring social harmony and stability over individual rights.88  Amidst 
the maelstrom of forces influencing the judicial policies has been the 
predominant principle of “resolving the case and resting the matter to 
promote social harmony.”89 To achieve that end, non-adversarial media-
tion and settlement of disputes are preferred and encouraged to put an 
end to all disputes, preferably in one sitting, once and for all.  Judges are 
mediators and facilitators of settlement.  The slogan becomes: “Media-
tion first and then combine mediation with adjudication.”90
Under this Utopian scheme of mediating and settling disputes once 
and for all, it might be a little anachronistic to propose that Chinese courts 
retain jurisdiction to modify post–divorce financial assistance based on 
material change of circumstances as suggested above.  Such a Utopian 
approach, however, is bound to lead to dystopian miscarriages of justice.
85. Ogletree et al., supra note 14.
86. Ng & He, supra note 69, at 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Yi Zhongfa (易忠法), Lun “Anjie Shiliao” (论 “案结事了”) [Discussing 
“Deciding the Case and Solving the Problem”], 2 Fazhi yu Shehui (法制与社会) 194 
(2008).
90. Wu Huiqing (吴会清) & Chen Rensheng (陈仁盛), Zhuoli huajie Shehui 
Maodun Qieshi Tuijin “Anjie Shiliao” (着力化解社会矛盾切实推进 “案结事了”) 
[Strive to Resolve Social Contradictions and Earnestly Implement “Resolving the 
Case and Resting the Matter”], Shidai Zhuren (时代主人), Feb. 2012, at 26, 27.
